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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

EDUARDO S. GARZA,

:

Petitioner-Appellant,

*

v.

:

TAMARA HOLDEN,

:

Case No. 920622-CA
Priority No. 3

Respondent-Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. This court has jurisdiction to
hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(g)
(Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
This case involves the summary dismissal of a petition for
writ of habeas corpus.
1.

The issues raised on appeal are:

Did the district court properly find that petitioner

waived consideration of his claims by failing to raise them on
direct appeal?
2.

Did

the

district

court

correctly

determine

that

petitioner's claims were frivolous because they were contrary to
the record of petitioner's criminal proceedings?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In reviewing an appeal from a dismissal of a habeas corpus
petition,

the

court

examines

the record

"in the

light most

favorable to the findings and judgment . . . and will not reverse
if there is a reasonable basis in the record to support the trial
court's denial of the writ."

Hall v. Utah Board of Pardons, 806

P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted).

See also Waastaff

v. Barnes. 802 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah App. 1990).
However,

no

deference

is

accorded

the

lower

court's

conclusions of law underlying the dismissal of the petition.
Rather, the court reviews such determinations for correctness.
Gerrish v. Barnes, 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah Dec. 16, 1992)
(citing

Fernandez

v.

Cook,

783

P.2d

547, 549

(Utah

1989))

(citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, or
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented is
contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner pled guilty to vehicular homicide, a second degree
felony on August 18, 1989

(R. 8).

Petitioner signed a plea

affidavit, admitting that he consumed alcohol and operated a motor
vehicle while having a blood alcohol level greater than
(Addendum F at 2).

.08

Petitioner also stated that he understood that

any sentencing recommendation made by either defense counsel or the
prosecutor was not binding upon the judge (Addendum F at 4, I 14).
2
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On September 27, 1989, petitioner's counsel filed a motion to
sentence petitioner to a felony one degree lower than the crime of
conviction (Addendum A).

Petitioner's counsel based his motion on

the fact that petitioner had been taking heart medication which
interacted

with the alcohol

involuntarily

intoxicated

he consumed,

and disoriented

causing

him to be

(Addendum B ) .

The

prosecutor did not contest petitioner's motion (Addendum A ) .
On September 29, 1989, the Honorable David S. Young sentenced
petitioner to serve a term of one-to-fifteen years at the Utah
State Prison (R. 8). On June 24, 1991, petitioner filed a motion
to withdraw his guilty plea (Addendum C).

It is unclear whether

petitioner abandoned his motion or whether the court denied it, as
the record

is devoid

pertaining

to

of either a minute entry or an order

petitioner's

motion

to

withdraw

his

plea.

Petitioner did not appeal either his conviction or, assuming his
motion was denied, the court's denial of his motion to withdraw his
plea (R. 5, I 4; Addendum D).
On June 5, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus and post-conviction relief

(R. 2; Addendum D ) .

Petitioner claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for
allegedly:

1) spending too little time with petitioner; 2)

suggesting that petitioner plead guilty, after telling petitioner
the State could not prove intent; 3) failing to obtain an affidavit
from petitioner's doctor, David Boorman; 4) failing to request a
continuance to obtain Dr. Boorman's affidavit; and 5) failing to
withdraw petitioner's guilty plea (R. 3-4; Addendum D ) .
3
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The petition was originally assigned to the Honorable Pat B.
Brian, but was transferred to the Honorable David S. Young on
August 10, 1992 (R. 23-24).

On September 3, 1992, the district

court dismissed the petition on the grounds that: 1) the issues in
the petition could and should have been raised on direct appeal;
and 2) petitioner's allegations were contrary to the record (R. 25;
Addendum E). Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on September
24, 1992 (R. 26).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A statement of facts beyond those set forth in the above
Statement of the Case is not necessary to resolve the issues
presented on appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court properly dismissed the petition for writ of
habeas corpus because all of petitioner's claims could and should
have been raised on direct appeal. Furthermore, the court reviewed
the file from petitioner's criminal proceedings and correctly
determined that petitioner's allegations were contrary to the
record evidence.

For these reasons, the court properly dismissed

the petition as frivolous.

4
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE
PETITION BECAUSE PETITIONER'S CLAIMS
COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON
APPEAL.
A writ of habeas corpus is not a substitute for direct appeal
and cannot be used to fulfill the purpose of regular appellate
review.

Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983).

See also

Waastaff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774 (Utah App. 1990); Hurst v. Cook,
777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989).

The Utah Supreme Court has stated:

It is therefore well settled in this state
that allegations of error that could have been
but were not raised on appeal from a criminal
conviction cannot be raised by habeas corpus
or postconviction review, except in unusual
circumstances.
Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1104.

The court further noted that habeas

corpus may be invoked
only when the court had no jurisdiction over
the person or the offense, or where the
requirements of law have been so disregarded
that
the
party
is
substantially
and
effectively denied due process of law, or
where some such fact is shown that it would be
unconscionable
not
to
re-examine
the
conviction.
Id. at 1105 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

If the alleged

error is known or should have been known to the petitioner at the
time judgment was entered,
it must be reviewed in the manner and within
the time permitted by regular prescribed
procedure, or the judgment becomes final and
is not subject to further attack, except in
some such unusual circumstance as we have
mentioned above.
Were it otherwise, the
regular rules of procedure governing appeals
5
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and the limitations of time specified therein
would be rendered impotent.
Id., (citations omitted).

Accord Gerrish v. Barnes, 202 Utah Adv.

Rep. 7, 9 (Utah Dec. 16, 1992).
Since all of petitioner's claims relate to the effectiveness
of counsel before and during the plea proceedings, petitioner must
have been or at least should have been aware of counsel's alleged
ineffectiveness
petitioner

by

should

the
have

time

he

raised

was

his

sentenced.

claims

on

Therefore,

direct

appeal.

Petitioner claims he did not appeal because "plea bargains are not
appealable,"

however,

he

is

mistaken

(R.

5;

Addendum D).

Petitioner moved to withdraw his guilty plea in June of 1991
(Addendum C ) .

In his motion to withdraw his plea, petitioner

raised essentially the same claims of ineffectiveness that form the
basis of his petition

(Addenda C & D; R. 3-4).

Therefore,

petitioner was aware of his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness at
the time he moved to withdraw his plea. Assuming the court denied
his motion to withdraw his plea, petitioner could have appealed.
Petitioner's failure to appeal procedurally bars him from raising
the claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus or other postconviction relief.
Even if petitioner abandoned his motion to withdraw his plea,
his claims are procedurally barred. Petitioner's failure to pursue
direct

remedies

does

collateral review.

not

render

his

claims

appropriate

for

Furthermore, petitioner has not demonstrated

unusual circumstances warranting consideration of these issues for

6
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habeas review.

Therefore, the district court properly dismissed

the petition.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED
THE PETITION AS FRIVOLOUS BECAUSE THE
ALLEGATIONS WERE CONTRADICTED BY THE
RECORD.
In dismissing the petition, the district court ruled that
petitioner's claims of ineffective counsel were contradicted by the
record

(R.

25; Addendum

E).

Although

the

court

did

not

specifically state that petitioner's claims were frivolous, two
factors demonstrate that the court actually dismissed the petition
on

that

basis.

First,

the

court

noted

that

the

issue of

ineffective counsel is normally one that would require a hearing,
but, thereafter, stated that the record offered no support for
petitioners's claims (R. 25; Addendum E).

Second, the court never

ordered the Attorney General's office to file a response.

Rule

65B(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires the court to
order a response unless the petition is dismissed as frivolous on
its face.

Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b) (7)-(8).

Since no response was

ordered, the court effectually dismissed the petition as frivolous
on its face.
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner claims
that his trial counsel was ineffective for allegedly 1) spending
too little time with petitioner; 2) suggesting that petitioner
plead guilty, after telling petitioner the State could not prove
intent; 3) failing to obtain an affidavit from petitioner's doctor,
7
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David Boorman; 4) failing to request a continuance to obtain Dr.
Boorman's affidavit; and 5) failing to withdraw petitioner's guilty
plea (R. 3-4; Addendum D ) .
Essentially, petitioner is claiming that his counsel was
ineffective at sentencing, for failing to obtain an affidavit of
Dr. Boorman.

In order to determine whether counsel's advice

constitutes ineffective assistance, it is necessary to apply the
two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the United States
Supreme Court held that the two-part Strickland standard applies to
"challenges to guilty pleas based upon ineffective assistance of
counsel."

Hill, 474 U.S. at 58.

Therefore, "[w]hen a convicted

defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance,
the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness."
omitted).

Id., at 57

(citations

Additionally, "[t]he defendant must show that there is

a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Id.

The foregoing prejudice requirement is based on the Court's

conclusion that "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a
criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment."
Id.
The Supreme Court clarified the requirements of the prejudice
prong with respect to allegations of ineffectiveness during the
plea process, stating that in order to satisfy the prejudice prong,
8
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the petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability
that but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial."
added).

JId. at 59 (emphasis

The purpose of requiring a demonstration of prejudice

from petitioners who challenge the validity of their guilty pleas
on

the

ground

of

ineffective

counsel,

is

to

maintain

the

"fundamental interest in the finality of guilty pleas." JEd. at 58.
After

reviewing

the

record

from

petitioner's

criminal

proceedings, the district court correctly determined that the
petition was frivolous because it was directly contradicted by the
record (R. 25; Addendum E).

Essentially, petitioner's claims of

ineffectiveness are based on petitioner's belief that he was
sentenced for a second degree felony only because the district
court did not have Dr. Boorman's affidavit concerning petitioner's
prescription drugs. Petitioner alleges that if the court had been
aware of the drug-alcohol interaction, that he would only have been
sentenced for a third degree felony

a term of 0-5 years (See

Addendum D ) .
However, the record demonstrates that counsel was well aware
of petitioner's heart attack and the prescription medications
petitioner was taking when the crime occurred, and that counsel
conveyed that information to the district court (Addendum B, 2-3).
Although the court did not have an affidavit from Dr. Boorman, the
court was

informed

of petitioner's medical condition through

counsel's memorandum in support of sentencing petitioner to a third
degree felony (Addendum B).

Petitioner's counsel stated Dr.
9
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Boorman's position in his memorandum, with no opposition from the
prosecutor. Since the facts concerning petitioner's condition and
Dr. Boorman's opinion concerning the impact of any prescription
medicines were undisputed, there was no need to obtain a separate
affidavit from Dr. Boorman. The trial court was fully aware of Dr.
Boorman's position, and therefore, petitioner was not prejudiced by
the lack of an affidavit.
Additionally, petitioner acknowledged that in addition to the
ingestion of prescription drugs, he had consumed approximately one
six-pack of beer (Addendum B at 3).

Petitioner did not dispute

that at the time he drove, his blood alcohol level was .16, twice
the legal limit
admitted that he

(Addendum B at 2).

Additionally, petitioner

"consumed alcohol to such a degree that it

rendered [him] . . . incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle"
(Addendum F at 2).

Despite defense counsel's assertion that

petitioner's intoxication was involuntary, there was ample evidence
to

support

intoxicated.

a

conclusion

that

petitioner

was

voluntarily

Therefore, counsel's advice that petitioner plead

guilty, based on these facts, was "within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."

474 U.S. at 56.

Petitioner must also show that absent counsel's shortcomings,
petitioner would not have pled guilty, however, the petition lacks
any allegation of prejudice (R. 2-11; Addendum D).

Moreover, the

record demonstrates that petitioner was not prejudiced by the
alleged deficiencies in counsel's performance.

Petitioner signed

a plea affidavit, indicating that his plea of guilty was a knowing,
10
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voluntary, and intelligent choice (Addendum F ) .

By signing the

affidavit, petitioner also admitted that he understood that any
sentencing recommendation made by either defense counsel or the
prosecutor, was not binding on the judge

(Addendum F at 4).

Therefore, even if counsel provided the court with Dr. Boorman's
affidavit, the court was not bound to follow counsel's sentencing
recommendation (Addendum F at 4). See also. State v. Thurston. 781
P.2d 1296 (Utah App. 1989) (sentencing recommendations are not
binding upon the court).
The foregoing demonstrates that petitioner failed to meet
the Strickland-Hill standard of ineffectiveness. Accordingly, this
Court should uphold the district court's ruling.

See Medina v.

Cook, 779 P.2d 658 (Utah 1989) (petition for habeas corpus properly
dismissed where ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not
supported by the record); See also Hill, 474 U.S. at 60 (district
court did not err in declining to hold a hearing on ineffective
assistance of counsel claim where petitioner failed to allege
necessary prejudice).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this court should affirm the district
court's dismissal of the petition

for habeas

corpus relief.

Petitioner could and should have raised his claims on appeal.
Furthermore, petitioner's allegations were contradicted by the
record.
WHEREFORE, the court should affirm the dismissal of the
petition for writ of habeas corpus.

11
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this l5>

day of March, 1993.

ANGELA^F. MICKLOS
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed, postage prepaid, this
day of March, 1993 to:
Eduardo S. Garza
Appellant Pro Se
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
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JAMES I. WATTS #4768
Attorney for Defendant
1245 East Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 484-3000

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

]

Plaintiff,

i

vs.

]
1

MOTION
Case No. ^ 1 ^ 0 ( 0 3 5

EDUARDO GARZA
Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant, Eduardo Garza, by and through his
attorney of record, James I. Watts, and pursuant to stipulation
with the Salt Lake County Attorneyfs Office, submits this Motion
pursuant to §77-35-12, Utah Code of Criminal Procedure and does
request that the Defendant be sentenced pursuant to §76-3-402 of
the Utah Criminal Code to the next lower degree charged, doing so
for the reasons contained in the Memorandum and Affidavit filed
in support of this Motion.
DATED this ^7

~

day of September
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The foregoing Motion was hand delivered to Scott W. Reed,
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney at 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84111 on this

Pi

day of September, 1989.
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^STRICT COURT

JAMES I. WATTS #4768
Attorney for Defendant
1245 East Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 484-3000
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case

EDUARDO GARZA

NO. nvo/ebs

Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant in the above-entitled matter and does
herewith submit this Memorandum to the Court in support of his
Motion for sentencing pursuant to §76-3-402 of the Utah Criminal
Code.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant, a 45 year old individual was charged with
criminal

homicide,

vehicle homicide,

in violation

of §76-5-

207(2) of the Utah Criminal Code, a Second Degree Felony.

The

events giving rise to the charge was an automobile accident which
occurred on or about May 10, 1989, in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, involving vehicles operated by the Defendant and one David
Crofts.

That the accident occurred on 1-215 and was a result of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

o

the Defendant who had been travelling northbound executing a Uturn in the northbound lanes and began travelling south in the
northbound lanes which resulted in a head-on collision with Mr.
Crofts, and as a result of that accident, Mr. Crofts was killed.
That as a result of the impact, Defendant was thrown from
his

vehicle,

unconscious.

sustaining

head

and

leg

injuries

and

rendered

He was subsequently transported by ambulance to

L.D.S. Hospital where he received medical treatment

for his

injuries and a technician drew blood for purposes of chemical
analysis.

That the chemical analysis performed by the L.D.S.

Hospital resulted in a determination that the Defendant's blood
alcohol content was .16 by weight, and that further there were
other substances in the blood stream which were not isolated as
to origin, but according to the report, were not marijuana or
other non-prescription drugs.

That the facts further show that

in February of 1989, the Defendant did suffer a major heart
attack and was treated by a David C. Boorman of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, at Holy Cross Hospital in Salt Lake County.

That

during the hospitalization for treatment of his heart condition,
Mr. Garza was prescribed numerous medications both to stabilize
the heart and to reduce the pains of angina which he continues to
suffer.
That

following

his release

from the hospital, he was

2
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r\

directed

and

required

to

continue

to

take

the

following

medications as part of his ongoing post-hospitalization care:
Tenormin, Cordizin and in those instances where there was an
onset of extreme angina, Nitrostat.
That

on the date

of the

accident, Mr. Garza did at

approximately 7:30 p.m. take the medications prescribed and did
consume that medication with alcohol.

That Mr. Garza had been

consuming alcohol during the late afternoon and early evening
hours, consuming approximately one six-pack of beer during the
period of time 6:00 p.m. until 8:00 to 8:30 p.m.

That following

the consumption of the alcohol, Defendant did attempt to drive
himself to his home located in West Valley City, during which
time the accident did occur.
ARGUMENT
THAT INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION IS A DEFENSE TO A CHARGE OF
WHICH AN ELEMENT IS "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE".
That

as

a

result

of the prescribed

medications, the

Defendant was rendered involuntarily intoxicated and the charge
against him, a Second Degree Felony, to which he has entered a
guilty plea, should be reduced to a Third Degree Felony for
purposes of sentencing.
Utah Code Annotated §76-5-207 defines automobile homicide
as follows:

3
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(2)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile
homicide, a Second Degree Felony, if the actor
operates a motor vehicle which while having a
blood-alcohol content of .08 percent or greater by
weight, or which under the influence of alcohol and
any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and
any drug, to a degree which renders the actor
incapable of safely operating a vehicle and causes
the death of another by operating the vehicle in a
criminally negligent manner.
(b)
For purposes of this subsection
"criminally negligent" means criminal negligence as
defined by §76-2-103(4) Utah Criminal Code.
The relevant section of the Utah Criminal Code defines
criminal negligence as follows:
(a) "A person engages in conduct: (4) with
criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct,
or the result of his conduct when he ought to be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will occur.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that a
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's viewpoint.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that criminal
negligence requires more than the actor1s intoxication, in the
case

of

State

of

Utah

v.

McPhee,

in

which

they

stated:

"...Intoxication is not prima facia evidence, but only a factor
to be considered along with the other factors"

(See Estate of

Reuben, Utah 663 P.2d 445 (1983); State v. Chavez, Utah, 605 P.2d
1226 (1979).
4
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When evaluating intoxication as a defense to a criminal
charge# the Courts of this country and Utah have uniformly held
that the actor's voluntary intoxication is not a valid defense in
those offenses when "recklessness or criminal negligence" is an
element of the offense.

That as a result of those numerous

holdings, the Utah Legislature in 1973 did adopt the following
statute which is codified as UCA §76-2-306:
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense
to a criminal charge unless such intoxication
negates the existence of the mental state which is
an element of the offense; however, if recklessness
or criminal negligence establishes an element of a
defense, and the actor is unaware of the risk of
voluntary
intoxication, his unawareness is
immaterial of the prosecution for that offense.
See also State v. Standford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988; State v.
Padilla. Ill, Utah A.D. Rep. 34 June 30, 1989.
In this instance, it is well settled that a voluntary
intoxication would not constitute a valid defense for the crime
as charged since criminal negligence and recklessness constitutes
the basis upon which the charge is brought and the Utah statute
is clear.
As well settled as the principal of law that voluntary
intoxication does not constitute a valid defense to a Defendant
charged

with

a

non-specific

intend

crime,

is

equally

the

principal that involuntary intoxication may provide a defense to

5
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crimes not only involving specific intent but crimes involving a
mens rea of recklessness.

This doctrine has been embraced by

numerous states and acceptance can be found in decisions based on
the common law as far back as the middle 1700's.

Thus, in 1 Hale

history of the Pleas of the Crown, 32 (1778) it is said:
That if a person by the unskillfulness of his
physician or by the contrivance of his enemies, eat
or drink such a thing as causeth such a temporary
or permanent phrenzy, as aconitum or nux vomica,
this puts him into the same condition, in
reference, to crimes, as any other phrenzy, and
equally excuseth him.
The principle of involuntary intoxication as a defense to
non-specific intent crimes has been embraced in varying degrees
by the Courts of the United States.

The Arizona Supreme Court

has adopted the position that: "Involuntary intoxication would be
a

complete

defense

if the Defendant was compelled

to drink

against his will and "his reason was destroyed" so "that he did
not understand

and appreciate the consequences of his acts."

Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 P. 1029 (1931).

The Minnesota

Supreme Court in the case of City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238
N.W. 2d 851, addressed and thoroughly analyzed the defense of
involuntary intoxication and identified four distinct means by
which a defendant could become involuntarily intoxicated.
last of the four methods accepted by the Court was:

The

"When the

Defendant is unexpectedly intoxicated due to the ingestion of a
6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

medically

prescribed

drug,

if

the

prescribed

drug

is

taken

pursuant to medical advise, and without Defendant's knowledge of
the

potentially

further

intoxicating

reduced

the

scope

effects."

of

the

The

application

Minnesota
of

Court

involuntary

intoxication, by prescribing requirements for its application as
a defense.

Those requirements for application are as follows:

(1) That the Defendant must not know, or have
reason to know, that the prescribed drug is likely
to have an intoxicating effect.
(2) That the prescribed drug is the cause of
the intoxication.
(3)
That the defendant, due to
intoxication, is temporarily insane.

involuntary

The Minnesota Court further defined "legally insane" pursuant to
Minnesota statute as follows:
...But he shall not be excused from criminal
liability except upon proof that at the time of
committing
the alleged criminal act, he was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from one of
these causes, as not to know the nature of his act,
or that it was wrong. (Minn. St. §671.026).
The principle of involuntary intoxication to non-specific
intent

crimes

§2.04(4),

10

is

likewise

U.L.A.

embraced

473;

by

the Model

Involuntary

Penal

intoxication

Code,
is

an

affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor
at the time of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate

his

criminality

(wrongfulness)

or

to

7
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conform

his

r^

conduct to the requirement of the law".

The defendant must have

the capability of forming an opinion as to the reckless nature or
the consequences of his actions if such a standard is to be
applied.

This appears to be the position of the Utah Supreme

Court when it addressed issues of "recklessness in the case of
State v. Standford, 269 P.2d 254, 263 (Utah 1988) in which they
state:

"...the

term

"recklessness"

awareness of a risk is the same as

requires

a

conscious

"knowing that the risk

exists"".
Clearly# the degree of intoxication is one of the factors
to be considered by a Court in evaluating whether the Defendant
was reckless or criminally negligent, but intoxication in and of
itself is not sufficient basis for such a ruling.
Supreme

Court

has

in numerous decisions

set

The Utah

forth the many

factors which may be considered in determining the degree of
culpability with which an actor acted.

Estate of Reuben, Utah,

663 P.2d 445, 448-49 (1983); State v. Riddle, 112 Utah 356, 364,
188 P.2d 449, 453 (1948); State v. Cook, 21 Utah 2d 36, 439 P.2d
852

(1968).

The Alabama Supreme Court held in the case of

Johnson v. State, 32 Ala. App. 217, 24 So. 2d 228, that a
defendant's

intoxication

produced

by

drugs, prescribed

by a

doctor and an over indulgence of whiskey constituted involuntary
intoxication and that the combination so impaired Defendant's
8
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mind as to render him incapable and totally irresponsible for his
acts.
The Defendant's testimony, if this matter had been tried,
would be that he had consumed approximately 6 beers over a period
of some 2 1/2 hours during the late afternoon and early evening
of the accident.
eaten.

That during the day, he does not recall having

That at approximately

6:00

- 7:00 p.m. he took the

medications Tenormin and Cordizin as prescribed, doing so with a
beer.

That he had not been instructed not to take the medication

with alcohol and that no warning appeared on the drug containers.
That following the pills, he can recall and recollect the events
approximately

one-half

hour,

after

which

time he no longer

recalls the events of the evening, to include the accident which
occurred some hours following his ingestion of the medication.
That he was a periodic consumer of alcohol and is aware of
the affects that alcohol has upon him.

That in the past he has

consumed amounts in excess of the six cans consumed this day
without

experiencing

any of the problems now complained of,

including disorientation and loss of memory.
as prescribed

according to the information

The two medications
contained

in the

Physicians Desk Reference on medications indicates the following:
(1)

That Cordizin is an anti-hypertension drug designed to

regulate blood pressure through the dilation of arteries and
9
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veins and intended to relieve the pain associated with angina;
(2)

Tenormin is a beta blocker designed to reduce the demand for

oxygen by the heart, through the reduction of a patient1s pulse.
That

the

medical

information

and

literature

indicates

that

neither Tenormin nor Cordizin are drugs which when taken in
combination with
effect.

alcohol results

in an increased potency or

The drugs in and of themselves, depending upon the

physical condition of the patient, may result in artificially
reducing the blood pressure and the oxygen going to the brain
which may result in disorientation, delirium of the patient or in
extreme cases loss of consciousness.

That it is likely in this

instance that the medications themselves were the cause of the
disorientation and loss of cognitive capabilities which resulted
in Mr. Garza executing a U-turn on the northbound lanes of 1-215
and proceeding south and resulting in the accident.

That he does

not recall seeing oncoming traffic or hearing or seeing warnings
being given by the operator of other vehicles.
That Mr. Garza had no way of knowing that the medications
may cause the effects now complained of so as to conform his
behavior and to cease operating motorized vehicles during the
time in which he was on such medication.

That after taking the

medication, the mental state of the Defendant became such that he
did not and could not have perceived that his conduct constituted
10
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a substantial and unjustifiable risk to both himself and to
others as to constitute a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would exercise as the drug had
rendered

him

incapable

attached

Affidavit

of

of making
Dr.

such decisions,

Boorman, who

after

(See the

reviewing the

medical records and discussing this matter with the Defendant has
developed

an

opinion

that

the

medications

prescribed

and

identified herein were likely the cause Mr. Garza's substantial
disorientation).
CONCLUSION
That as a result of the involuntary intoxication of Mr.
Garza, through the injunction of prescribed drugs he cannot be
held to the standard

articulated

for criminal negligence as

defined by the Utah statute, and that the Court should sentence
him under §76-5-207(1) to a Third Degree Felony with an element
of simple negligence.
DATED this

J) 7 *~ day of September
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The foregoing Memorandum was hand delivered to Scott W.
Reed, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney at 231 East 400 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111 on this

2 ~~)

day of September,

1989.

S E C R E T A R Y / &
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EDUARDO S. GARZA

Third Judicial Dfctrict

Pro Se

JUN 2 ^ 1991

P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEFENDANTS MOTION TO
WITHDRAW PLEA OF GUILTY

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff

891-901035FS

vs
EDUARDO S. GARZA
Defendant
COMES NOW,

Judge David S. Young
the defendant, Pro Se, and pursuant

to rule 11

(e), 5, and 6, moves this court to vacate the defendant's plea of
guilty in the above-entitled matter. This motion is based on the
following;
1. Defendant's counsel, James Watts, mislead
into

believing

defendant's

that

he

cardiologist,

could
that

secure
would

an
show

the defendant

affidavit
the

cause

from

the

of

the

accident to be not entirely the fault of the defendant.
2. Defendant's counsel told him that the affidavit, plus a
plea of guilty would result in a plea bargin with the states
attorney.
3. That counsel failed to secure such affidavit, and as a
result the state's attorney refused to comply with his part of the
plea bargin.
4. That defendant's counsel did not tell him of the failure
to secure said affidavit until the moment of sentencing.
5. That the defendant had already entered his plea when he
found out that counsel could not complete the plea bargin.
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n
6. That at the time he discovered the plea bargin would not
be maintained, the defendant was severely depressed, and was not
in complete control of his faculties%
7. That he was recovering from a major heart attack at the
time

of

sentencing.

In

combination

with

the

depression,

the

defendant did not rightfully know what he was acceeding to.
WHEREFORE, the defendant moves this court .. allow him
withdraw his plea of guilty and remand this matter for trial.
DATED this

%0 Tj\, day of June 1991.
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^ ^
EDUARDO S. GARZA
\ R ^ Attorney Pro Se
\ ^\ Utah State Prison
1
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
EDUARDO S. GARZA,
Petitioner,
VS.

*
*
*
*

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND POST
CONVICTION RELIEF

*

TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden,
*
Case No.
Respondent.
*
Judge
COMES NOW the Petitioner, EDUARDO S. GARZA, pursuant to the

¥k(mm

following Rule of Civil Procedure:
X

Rule 65B(b)
Rule 65B(b)
Rule 65B(b)
Rule 65B(c)
, and for cause of
1.

since claim is
since claim is
since claim is
since claim is
action alleges

based on original commitment, or
based on parole violation, or
based on probation violation, or
based on parole grant hearing,
as follows:

Petitioner is being illegally restrained at the following

location: Utah State Prison, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020.
2.

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced at the following

Court: Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
The dates of the proceedings in which the conviction was entered
are as follows: September 29, 1989.
The case number for these proceedings is:

not known; _X_ known

and is case number 891-901035 FS.
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF
3.

In plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis

of which the Petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as
the result of the commitment (or terms of parole) are as follows:
a.
representing

Petitioner's retained counsel was ineffective in
the

Petitioner

for

the

charges

which

lead

to

Petitioner's incarceration.
b.

Petitioner met several times throughout his court

appearances with his retained counsel between 5-11-89 to 9-29-89
for

approximately

10-15

minutes

each

time.

However, when

petitioner went before the court for sentencing counsel talked to
the petitioner less them 5 minutes.
c.

Petitioner's counsel assured the petitioner that

there was no way that the petitioner could be convicted of the
crime the petitioner was charged with.

Counsel told petitioner

that the State could not prove intent because he was under the
infiuenee—ef—intoxicating—ete^gs—at the time.

However, 1 ater

counsel suggested that petitioner plead guilty to the charges.
d.

Petitioner's counsel failed to obtain an Affidavit

from the Petitioner's doctor, Dr. David Boorman, ttiat "was a
prerequisitefeetpetitioner's plea bargains^ was hinged on.

Dr.

Boorman's affidavit was to state that he had prescribed medication
(Zantac) to the petitioner. Dr. Boorman told petitioner that there
2
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF
would not be an adverse effect if the above medication was mixed
with alcohol, when in fact the petitioner did experience adverse
effects.

Based upon Dr. Boorman's information and the fact that

the petitioner did have a reaction from the medication and alcohol
being mixed, the Prosecutor and Petitioner's attorney reached an
agreement that petitioner would plead guilty to Second Degree
Felony (Criminal Homicide) and be sentenced for a Third Degree
Felony.
d.

Counsel failed to move the court for a continuance

in order to obtain the above-mentioned affidavit, and counsel
failed to subpoena Dr. Boorman to testify at the petitioner's court
hearing. Therefore, the Prosecutor backed out of the plea bargain
agreement.
e.

Counsel

failed

and

refused

to

withdraw

the

petitioner's plea bargain or to postpone the matter until Dr.
Boorman could be brought to court.
f.

Petitioner entered into the plea agreement at a time

when he was depressed, on medication and recovering from a heart
attack. When petitioner did realize what was happening it had been
42 days since the petitioner entered into the plea agreement and
petitioner was told that it was too late to withdraw his guilty
plea.

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

}

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF
f.

Counsel was ineffective and failed to adequately

represent the petitioner in the best interest of the petitioner.
4.

The

judgment

of

conviction

or

the

commitment

for

violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal.
Yes

_X_No

The number and caption or title of the appellate
proceeding and the results of the review are as follows:

It was not appealed because plea bargains are not
appealable.

Question not applicable since this claim concerns a parole grant
hearing for which there is no appeal or administrative remedy.
5.

The legality of the commitment for violation of probation

or parole or the legality of the parole grant hearing has been
reviewed on appeal.

Yes

X

No

If so, the reasons for the

denial of relief in the prior proceeding are as follows:
6.

Petitioner requests that he be appointed legal counsel

based on the attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity.
7.

The

following

documents

are

attached

hereto

and

incorporated herein by reference (check all that apply):
Affidavits that support Petitioner's allegations
Copies of records that support Petitioner's allegations,
Other evidence that supports Petitioner's allegations
Copies of pleadings, orders and memoranda of the Court in
any other post-conviction or civil proceeding that
adjudicated the legality of Petitioner's commitment
4
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF
8.

Petitioner was unable to obtain and attach the following

documents because

(list the efforts you made to obtain the

documents and the results of your efforts): (Jjyw/*! rr/i4&* T&2

7 €$T^ That

pursuant7 to URCP Rules

65B(b)(12) and

54(d),

Petitioner requests that this Court order the Respondent to obtain
such transcripts of proceedings or court records which are relevamt
and material to this case and requests that the county in which he
was originally charged be directed to pay the costs of the
proceeding.
10.

(See attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity).

Due to the continuing nature of the illegal restraint,

the statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-31.1
does not bar this action.
WHEREFORE# Petitioner prays that this Court:
1.

Schedule an evidentiary hearing at which time Petitioner

may be present and represented by counsel.
2.

Permit Petitioner, who remains indigent, to proceed

without prepayment of costs, fees or other assessments.
3.

Grant Petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in

Forma Pauperis, for witnesses and documents necessary to assist in
the proof of the facts alleged in the petition as stated above.

5
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF
4.

Issue an Order for Post Conviction Relief to have the

Petitioner brought before it, to the end that he may be discharged
from the illegal and unconstitutional confinement and restraint.
5.

(other relief 1

Dated this /(o

day of

7?24\4&&

, 199 2^-.

i

<4UeLQ

EDUARDC7 S. GAR!
Attorney Pro Se

6
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-IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , S T A T E OF UTAH
T H E STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff.

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

.

vs

I
Q£ifi

fi^Qsy

, "

\

S . *)drLL~ r.

0

( ^rjuJP \

Case No. .
>

Honorable

^s)Cuu

(

Clerk

Pffifl* ^

\

Reporter

frj

j
Defendant.

/

(l^/Kfa*-^

Bailiff

X finnAj

Date

<?{fa?/f9(

$ M he motion of(\ h)rdtt2* tn enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly Is D granted p(denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant teving been convicted by D a jury; O the court;^(plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of L A P ^ J L ^ Q D ^Hhn/fiMf
tyhtistUt a felony
t Othitlj
of \hApf] AJriegree, D a class
misdemeanor, being now present in cou^and ready for sentence and
represented h & fiin'tt^L
and the State being represented by §?• RxfM
is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life; .
* a not to exceed five years;
r\ \ c - \ \ —
\ yC of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
cX \ S \ \ v ^ ^O
j D of not less than five years and which may be for life;
l O - ^ ^ F p l -SVl*! Ouwv
D not to exceed
years;
i
-fj- 0 *J
ji and ordered to pay a fine in the amount o f S ^ n O D p * c w a.*SOO -h^M\C^c/^jU^O.
^f^csS^
fl^and ordered to pay restitution in thu amuuitt tyf"$=
to fchi ^ A v ^ v J*+~*n
k f ^.

/(Uc£*g
D such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, O Defense, D Court, Count(s)
are hereby dismissed.
D
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (Q prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
_ pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
^Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County^for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned
imprisoned in
in accordance
accordance with
with this
this Judgment
and
Judgme and Commitment.

X

Commitment shall issue _JfSMA^
DATED this £V-l*
L L _ At
day of

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
GARZA, EDUARDO S
PLAINTIFF
VS
HOLDEN, TAMARA
DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 920903255 HC
DATE 09/03/92
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK NP

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

THE PETITIONER'S PRO SE PETITION SEEKING HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF IS DENIED. THIS DENIAL IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE
MATTERS RAISED COULD OR SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL AND
WERE NOT. THE PETITIONER CLAIMS THAT COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE
AND WHILE THE COURT RECOGNIZES THAT THAT IS AN ISSUE THAT WILL
USUALLY REQUIRE A HEARING, THE FACTUAL BASIS CLAIMED IN SUPPORT
OF THE PETITION IS THAT COUNSEL FAILED TO SPEND ENOUGH TIME WITH
THE PETITIONER AND FAILED TO OBTAIN A PHYSICIAN'S AFFIDAVIT AS
TO THE AFFECT OF COMBINING ZANTAC WITH ALCOHOL.
THE PLEA CURED THE DEFECT. THE PETITIONER WAS REPRESENTED
BY RETAINED COUNSEL AND THE COURT CAN FIND NOTHING IN THE RECORD
TO CAUSE THE COURT TO BELIEVE THAT THE PETITIONER'S COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE.
THIS MINUTE ENTRY SIGNED BY THE COURT WILL CONSTITUTE THE
ORDER OF THE COURT.

C.C. TO MR. GARZA oJ) $4*
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<^s
Third Judicial District

JUDI

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

^ 81!

[ICT

.8W.TLAKECOUAKY

)

THE STATE OF UTAH,
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

Plaintiff,
V.

Criminal No. -&$+- I'di 1''TA.i Ti ZSDefendant.

COMES NOW, Adu***^

6*40 •? A

the defendant in this

case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of (guilty) j (no contest) to the
following crime(s):
DEGREE

CRIME
//f/tr£

/femKiSe

7 (*-$-*>7

(?•)(*)

PUNISHMENT (Min/Max^

Z**7>t'tf&tGf.

f^

B..

C.

D..

I have

received

a copy of the (charge) (^^inforrnat^ioi

against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature and
elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading (fguilty)_J(no
contest).
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>

The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as
follows:

w^rc

LJAWQ

/M.

£

0rthttmi/(jr

/rra/*

*•„, ¥

***<i net* *~//£<
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My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I
am criminally

liable, that constitutes

crime(s) charged are as follows: y^Lr

the
T

elements

of the

&//&{ tfexzuuir

S—

.Pi*

I am entering

this/these plea(s) voluntarily

and with

knowledge and understanding of the following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an

attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the court at no cost to me.
2.

I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel.

If I

have waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly,
intelligently

reasons:

3.

and

voluntarily

because

of

the

following

/j/fi

If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read

this statement and understand the nature and elements of the
charges, my

rights

in this

and

other

proceedings

by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
consequences Digitized
of my
plea
of guilty.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

and

the

^4^*

If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney

is Jrfto£$

/J/A TTS

/ and I have had an opportunity to

discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my
guilty plea with my attorney.
5.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.

6.

I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the

right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to
have them cross-examined by my attorney.

I also know that I

have the right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense
to testify in court upon my behalf.
7.

I know that I have a right to testify in my own

behalf but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to
testify

or

give

evidence

against

myself

and

no

adverse

inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify.
8.

I know that if I wish to contest the charge against

me I need only plead

H

not guilty1' and the matter will be set

for trial, at which time the State of Utah will have the burden
of proving
doubt.

each element

of

the charge

beyond

a

reasonable

If the trial is before a jury the verdict must be

unanimous.
9.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I

were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah
Court of Appeals or, where allowed, to the Supreme Court of
Utah and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such
appeal, those costs would be paid by the state.
v.
10. I know that the maximum possible sentence may be
imposed upon my plea of guilty, and that sentence may be for a
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prison term, fine, or both.
fine,

^J-?

a

% surcharge,

63-63-9, will be imposed.
the court

I know that
required

in addition to any

by Utah

Code

Annotated

I also know that I may be ordered by

to make restitution to any victim or victims of my

crimes.
11.

I

know

that

imprisonment

may

be

for

consecutive

periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to
more than one charge.
parole or

awaiting

I also know that if I am on probation,

sentencing

on another

offense

of which I

have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my plea
in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed upon me.
12.

I know and understand that by pleading

contest) I am waiving my statutory
set

out

in

entering
have

the

preceding

and constitutional

paragraphs.

such plea(s) I am admitting

committed

the

conduct

alleged

(guilty) (no

I

also

and do
and

know

rights

that

by

so admit that I

I am

guilty

of

the

crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered.
13.
result

My plea(s) of

of

(no contest) is/is not the

a plea bargain between myself

attorney.
bargain,

(guilty)

The promises, duties
if

any,

and

and the prosecuting

provisions

are fully contained

of

this

plea

in the Plea Agreement

attached to this affidavit.
14.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or

recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a
reduction
either
binding

of

the

defense
on

the

charges

counsel
judge.

or

for

sentencing

the

prosecuting

I also

know

that

made

or

attorney
any

sought
are

opinions
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by
not

they

-^

express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also
not binding on the court.

kind

15.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any

have

been

promises

made

except,

to

those

induce

me

contained

to

plead

herein

guilty,

and

and

no

in the attached

plea agreement, have been made to me.
16.
me by my

I have read this statement or I have had it read to
attorney,

and I understand

its provisions.

I know

that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this
affidavit.

I do not wish to make any changes because

all of

the statements are correct.
17.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my

attorney.
18.
through

I am

years of age; I have
/cf

the

English language•
medication

or

grade

and

I can

read

attended

school

and understand

the

I was not under the influence of any drugs,

intoxicants

plea(s) was made.

when

the

decision

I am not presently under

to

enter

the

the influence of

any drugs, medication or intoxicants.
19.

I believe myself

to be of a sound

and discerning

mind, mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect
or

impairment

that

would

prevent

me

from

knowingly,

intelligently and voluntarily entering my plea.
DATED this

//

day of ^ v

, 19fr3
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for
the defendant

above, and

that

statement

or

that

I have

discussed

it

with ^iny/her

£*ii/ctWQ

I know /he/she

read

it

and

has read the

to (^ig/her

believe

&iA£2A,

that

and

I have

he/she

fully

understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and
physically competent.
after

an

To the best of my knowledge and belief

appropriate

investigation,

the

elements

of

the

crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal
conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and

lant
CERTIFICATE QJ? PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am &i(e attorney for the State of Utah in
the case against

_, defendant.

reviewed this statement of the defendant
declarations,

including

the elements

I have

and find that the

of the offense of the

charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal
conduct which constitutes the offense are true and correct.

No

improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea
have been offered defendant.

The plea negotiations are fully

contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement
or

as

supplemented

on

record

before

the court.

There is

reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction

of

defendant

for

the

offense(s)

for
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